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SUMMARY OF REPLY 
The facts material to this appeal are relatively simple. 
Plaintiffs filed a claim against the Dewsnups, and the Dewsnups 
filed a counterclaim against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed a 
motion for summary judgment on their claim, which was granted. 
Neither plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the affidavit in 
support of the motion for summary judgment, nor the judgment 
itself either mentioned the Dewsnups' counterclaim or any of the 
issues raised in the Dewsnups' counterclaim. 
The Dewsnups later filed a motion to amend their 
counterclaim and a motion to either reconsider and set aside the 
summary judgment or to certify it as final so that it could be 
appealed. Judge Harding denied both motions, holding that the 
summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim had "implicitly" 
disposed of the Dewsnups' counterclaim. From that ruling the 
Dewsnups brought this appeal. 
Plaintiffs argue that the summary judgment on plaintiffs' 
claim "implicitly" disposed of the Dewsnups' counterclaim since 
there was a substantial factual overlap between plaintiffs' claim 
and the Dewsnups1 counterclaim. As previously discussed in the 
Appellants Brief and as discussed hereafter, the "factual 
overlap" test was rejected by the 1946 amendment to Rule 54(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires an 
"express" adjudication of claims. Furthermore, under the general 
principles governing the interpretation of judgments, the summary 
judgment, by its terms, did not dispose of the Dewsnups' 
counterclaim. Moreover, even if the summary judgment did 
"implicitly" dispose of the Dewsnups 1 counterclaim,, that 
dist -^  *'' • - M ha^. been invalid si nee it wou] d have been made 
without notice to u^ .: Dewsnups and therefore wou] d ha v e t eei 1 i n 
violation of: due process and :i n violation of Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rul^-s " -- -H-*- < 
Since the Dewsnups 1 counterclaim, was not disposed u! i! is 
still «subj^vt to adjudication and t hf- Dewsnuj: - - 7. ion tu amend 
11 * . -, • • -TiTitin1 '"»i in i 
tht- Dewsnups s counterclaim was 4 dispe »• * ne summary 
judgment d1-? * dispose of -1 *, a n s * ~ -^<d case and under 
P . . luiiniiiiiai j 
judgment is * , . subject t,.. -evision and should • ive either been 
reconsider^ 1 cuiu set dbiue UJ. ueitiiiea as final &o that it could 
be appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
r 
is ^c- uTdtt ., . 4.^  j, roper ay , < . - . ^  ridintiits 
feigned offense • ' *•. statemer - made about Joseph ;-
I 
irt record beiou * -,- ^ ? •• .; \» * A. orier^ plaintiffs 
never denieu t-iic truth of those statements. (R. 217-226, 2-, 
2 ';-'} 
This is the first time the Dewsnups wi 11 have this story 
heard It i s tn le that "the Dewsnups1 bankruptcy case has been 
heard 1 i\ " t: ; < • IJtal: I District court Judges, a United States 
2 
Bankruptcy Judge, a Federal District Court Judge, the United 
States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and ... [presently] the 
United States Supreme Court." (Appellees Brief, p. 2) However, 
as discussed in paragraph 5 below, the Dewsnups1 bankruptcy case 
is very different from this case. 
In plaintiffs1 "Statement of Facts" in their Appellees 
Brief, plaintiffs "skip over" a number of facts that are material 
to this case: 
1. The Purchase Contract had terminated before Joseph 
Henroid made the $49,966.21 payment on the Purchase Contract. In 
paragraphs 4 and 5 on page 5 of their Appellees Brief, plaintiffs 
correctly state that the Dewsnups1 $119,000 loan was secured by 
the Purchase Contract, and that Joseph Henroid made the January 
2, 1980 payment on the Purchase Contract on June 7, 1980 
($49,966.21), but plaintiffs neglect to state that the Purchase 
Contract had already terminated when Joseph Henroid made that 
payment. The Purchase Contract gave the Dewsnups the right to 
terminate the Purchase Contract by failing to make any of the 
annual payments due under the Purchase Contract on January 2 of 
each year by the following June 2: 
If Buyers default on the payment falling due on January 
2, 1977, or any payment thereafter falling due, and if 
such sum or any part thereof remains in default for a 
period of five months, then Buyers shall forfeit any 
and all right, title and interest that they otherwise 
would have in and to the property covered by this 
agreement, title to which has not passed to the Buyers 
at that time, and this agreement shall terminate. 
(R. 153-54). 
3 
Furthermore, If any January 7 payment due under the Purchase 
Contract was not paid b\ - the noxt succeed;] ng .June 2 the escrow -
agent holding title to the land being purchased under the 
Purchase Contract was instructed to retur n title to the land to 
the seller: 
Your instructions are to ..release to the Seller the 
warranty deed...1f... the Buyers shall default in the 
payment of any sum or any part thereof remains i 
default for a period -<? *:'-e ~onths. 
(R. 183-184 
O n J i i n e 2 , - . . : . . • • • . . : • - ">, 
1980 payment by June , — u r c h a s e C o n t r a c t t e r m i n a t e d 
a c c o r d i n g t o ' •-- f e r ^ , t h e esc rov r - *--4 - l e ' i ^ e ^ d r. i ^ l e Lw _**e 
l a n d back t o t h e s e l l e r a s p r o v i d e d I u iiii III u csjcruw 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , and a l l of t h e Dewsnups* r h|hl , t i t l e and I n t e r e s t 
i i i t::l le ] and be i ng pi i r e h a s e i inder t h e P u r c h a s e c o n t r a c t was 
f o r f e i t e d . (R 92 , III 2 5 , 2 0 0 • C)11! ) 31? i ve ill ,'", I ,n \ e r , on -Tnno 7 _ 
1980, when J o seph H e n r o i d made t h e J a n u a r y 2, 1980 pa 
( * I 11 I i p a l ly I H I in i 
(:< >* . l^ b-jL^ o, *;u \e Assignment, ut Contract on-v i^u ^ 
the Dewsnups reimburse plaintiffs fe payment made by plaintiffs 
i > 
[The Dewsnups] agree chat in the event they are in 
default that [plaintiffs] may make the payments due 
under and pursuant to [the Purchase Contract] and will 
be reimbursed for the same by [the Dewsnups]. 
(*. 145). 
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Therefore, because the Purchase Contract had terminated before 
Joseph Henroid made the $49,966.21 payment, that payment was not 
made "under and pursuant to the Purchase Contract" and the 
Dewsnups had no obligation to reimburse Joseph Henroid for that 
payment. 
2. The Dewsnups paid in full the $119,000 loan. In 
paragraph 8 on page 5 of their Appellees Brief, plaintiffs state 
that ff[i]n December 1980, the Dewsnups paid some, but not all, of 
the amounts due plaintiffs." In fact, the Dewsnups paid in full 
the $119,000 loan, but did not pay the $49,966.21 plaintiffs 
claimed the Dewsnups were required to reimburse them. In at 
least three places in the record, plaintiffs have acknowledged 
that the Dewsnups paid the $119,000 loan in full. (R. 66-67, 70, 
254) . 
3. The $49,966.21 payment was not secured by the Trust 
Deed. In paragraph 8 on page 5 of their Appellees Brief, 
plaintiffs state they brought a motion for summary judgment on 
the $49,966.21. Plaintiffs fail to state that the motion for 
summary judgment was to foreclose on the Trust Deed on the 
Dewsnups1 farm for the $49,966.21 payment, even though the claim 
for the $49,966.21 payment, even if valid, was not secured by the 
Trust Deed. (R. 66-70). The Trust Deed only secured the $119,000 
loan, and did not secure payments made under the Assignment of 
Contract: 
[The] trustor conveys and warrants to trustee in trust 
with power of sale, following described property...for 
5 
the purpose of securing payment of the indebtedness 
evidence by a promissory note of even date herewith, in 
the principal sums of $33,000; 56,000 and 30,000, made 
by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the 
times, in the manner and with interest as thereon set 
forth and any extensions and/or renewals or 
modifications thereof. 
(R. 133, 138). 
4. The motion for summary judgment only requested summary 
judgment on plaintiffs1 claim, and not on the Dewsnups1 
counterclaim; the Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure only 
granted summary judgment on plaintiffs1 claim, and not the 
Dewsnups' counterclaim. In paragraphs 8-11 on pages 5 and 6 of 
their Appellees Brief, plaintiffs correctly state that they filed 
a motion for summary judgment and a supporting affidavit of Louis 
Timm, and that summary judgment was granted. However, plaintiffs 
fail to state that plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment was 
only for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim, not on the 
Dewsnups1 counterclaim. (R. 66-67). Neither plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment nor the affidavit of Louis Timm either 
mention the Dewsnups1 counterclaim or any of the issues raised in 
the Dewsnups' counterclaim. (R. 66-70). Similarly, the Summary 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure only granted summary judgment 
on the plaintiffs' claim, and did not mention either the 
Dewsnups' counterclaim or any of the issues raised in the 
Dewsnups' counterclaim. (R. 75-79). 
5. The issues in the bankruptcy case are different from the 
issues in this case. In paragraphs 15-22 on pages 6 and 7 of 
6 
their Appellees Brief, plaintiffs imply that the issues being 
considered in this case have somehow been considered by the 
bankruptcy court or are currently on appeal from the bankruptcy 
court. In fact, the issues in this case are very different from 
the issues in the Dewsnups' bankruptcy case. The main issue in 
the Dewsnups1 bankruptcy case is whether under Section 506(d) of 
the Bankruptcy Code the Dewsnups can "redeem" their farm by 
paying the fair market value of their farm to plaintiffs, or 
whether they must pay the total amount owing to plaintiffs even 
though it far exceeds the value of their farm. In Judge Clarkfs 
20-page opinion, he decided that under Section 506(d) of the 
Bankruptcy Code the Dewsnups could only "redeem" their farm by 
paying the total amount due to plaintiffs. (R. 322-341.) The 
Dewsnups then appealed that decision to the Federal District 
Court, the Tenth Circuit and certiorari has now been granted 
before the United States Supreme Court. (R. 220). That issue, 
however, involves the construction of federal bankruptcy law and 
is very different from the issues raised in this case. 
Plaintiffs correctly point out that 4 years ago during the 
course of the bankruptcy proceedings the Dewsnups did try to 
raise the issue that the Summary Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure should be set aside because the $119,000 loan had 
been paid. The Dewsnups argued that because the Summary Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure was signed before but not entered until 
after the Dewsnups had filed bankruptcy, the automatic stay 
7 
provision of 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a)(1) (the "Section 362 
automatic stay") voided entry of the Summary Judgment and Decree 
of Foreclosure and therefore the bankruptcy court could go behind 
the Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and reconsider the 
underlying merits of that judgment.
 m However, the bankruptcy 
court rejected that argument and refused to void the Summary 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, accepting it as a valid state 
court judgment and therefore refusing to consider its underlying 
merits* In his affidavit, the Dewsnups1 bankruptcy attorney at 
the time, Scott Pierce, stated: 
6. Paragraphs 20, 21, 22 and 23 of [the complaint 
filed by the Dewsnups in bankruptcy court (the 
"Complaint")] alleged that the plaintiffs1 Summary 
Judgment and Foreclosure Decree had been entered in 
violations of the Section 362 automatic stay since it 
had been signed, but not entered, until after the 
Dewsnups had filed bankruptcy. 
7. Judge Clark ruled from the bench that the Summary 
Judgment and Foreclosure Decree was not entered in 
violation of the Section 362 automatic stay. 
8. Having ruled that the Summary Judgment and 
Foreclosure Decree was not entered in violation of the 
Section 362 automatic stay, Judge Clark gave full faith 
and credit to the Summary Judgment and Foreclosure 
Decree, and refused to consider the allegations set 
forth in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Complaint, 
which went to the underlying claims in the Summary 
Judgment and Foreclosure Decree. 
9. No evidence was introduced at trial on paragraphs 
8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Complaint. 
10. Judge Clark did not consider the allegations set 
forth in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Complaint. 
11. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 
and 11 of the Complaint were not litigated or 
8 
considered by the bankruptcy court in any form or 
fashion. 
(A copy of Scott Pierce's Affidavit is attached hereto as Exhibit 
A and is found in the record at R. 318-321.) 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DEWSNUPS1 COUNTERCLAIM HAS NOT BEEN ADJUDICATED. 
A. UNDER RULE 54(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, THE DEWSNUPS' COUNTERCLAIM WAS NOT 
DISPOSED OF BY THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Prior to the 19461 amendment to Rule 54(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a "factual overlap" test was used to 
determine whether a judgment on one claim also "implicitly" 
disposed of other claims. 10 C. Wright, A. Miller and M. Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, pp. 20-29 (1983). Where one 
claim was disposed of, if other claims that had a sufficient 
"factual overlap" with the claim disposed of, that claim was also 
held to have been implicitly disposed of. Id. As discussed in 
the Dewsnups1 Appellants Brief at pages 16-20, this approach did 
not work because the parties did not know which claims had and 
which claims had not been disposed of. Thus, parties with other 
claims were placed in the untenable position of having to 
immediately appeal their claim or risk a court later holding that 
1
 The text in 10 C. Wright, A. Miller and M* Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, pp. 20-29 (1983) states that this 
amendment was made in 1948. However, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 54 (1982) 
states that this amendment was made in 1946. The 1946 date has 
been used both in the Appellants Brief and in this Appellants 
Reply Brief. 
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there was sufficient "factual overlap11 between the claims 
expressly disposed of and their claim and therefore their claim 
had been implicitly disposed of. Therefore, in 1946 Rule 54(b) 
was amended to provide that claims could only be expressly 
disposed of so that the parties would know which claims had and 
which claims had not been disposed of. 
In their Appellees Brief, plaintiffs argue pre-1946 law. 
(See Appellees Brief, pp. 9, 11-12) Plaintiffs argue that there 
was sufficient "factual overlap" between their claim and the 
Dewsnups1 counterclaim to justify a holding that the disposition 
of their claim implicitly disposed of the Dewsnups' counterclaim. 
That was the test prior to 1946, but that is not the test today. 
Rule 54(b) now requires an express disposition of claims. 
The two cases cited by the plaintiffs both involve cases 
where a claim was considered and intended to be disposed of, but 
was inadvertently not mentioned in the subsequent judgment. In 
Bennett v. Trio Industries, Inc., 306 F.2d 546 (1st Cir. 1962), 
both the claim and counterclaim were tried: 
The factual issues posed by this action and the 
counterclaim were fully developed and explored at the 
trial. And the court below made full findings of fact 
on every one of them. 
Id. at 548. 
Similarly, in Ford Motor Co. v, Transport Indemnity Company, 795 
F.2d 538 (6th Cir. 1986), the counterclaimants' counterclaims 
were "addressed" and "argued." Id. at 543. In both Bennett and 
in Ford Motor Co.. the court held that the claims in question 
10 
had been tried and considered and were intended to have been 
disposed of but were inadvertently omitted from the final 
judgment. Those cases do not apply here. The Dewsnups1 
counterclaim was not before the court on plaintiffs1 motion for 
summary judgment. The Dewsnups1 counterclaim was never actually 
tried or considered. 
In two recent cases this Court has refused to take 
jurisdiction where less than all of the claims in the case had 
been adjudicated and the judgment had not been certified as final 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
First Security Bank of Utah v. Conlin, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 
(July 9, 1991); A.J. Mackay Company V. Okland Construction 
Company, Inc. 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (August 16, 1991). Had the 
Dewsnups appealed the Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
when it was entered, this is exactly what would have happened to 
them since the Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure had not 
been certified as final and did not dispose of all the claims in 
this case (having not disposed of the Dewsnups1 counterclaim). 
To now hold that the Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
was final (having implicitly disposed of the Dewsnups' counter-
claim) would put every party in the untenable position of not 
knowing when a judgment was final, and having to appeal every 
judgment that expressly adjudicates less than all the claims in a 
case in order to protect themselves against a later finding that 
the judgment had implicitly disposed of all the claims in the 
11 
case and could no longer be appealed. Parties have to be able to 
rely on the express language of a judgment. If a judgment 
doesn't say it disposes of a claim, parties shouldn't have to 
guess as to whether implicitly it actually does. 
B. THE DEWSNUPS' COUNTERCLAIM IS NOT AN AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE. 
Plaintiff allege that the Dewsnups1 counterclaim "was 
comprised of several affirmative defenses...that were 
characterized by the Dewsnups' attorney as a Counterclaim." 
(Appellees Brief, p. 12). The Dewsnups' counterclaim was not an 
affirmative defense. The Dewsnups' counterclaim states a cause 
of action for reformation of the Trust Deed and the Purchase 
Contract. A claim for reformation of instruments is a 
counterclaim, and not an affirmative defense. That very issue 
was decided by the Utah Supreme Court in Harman v. Yeaqer, 134 
P.2d 695 (Utah 1943) . 
C. UNDER THE GENERAL RULES GOVERNING THE 
INTERPRETATION OF JUDGMENTS, THE 
DEWSNUPS' COUNTERCLAIM WAS NOT DISPOSED 
OF BY THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Even if Rule 54(b) does not prevent the implicit 
adjudication of the Dewsnups' counterclaim, under the general 
rules governing the interpretation of judgments, the Summary 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure did not dispose of the 
Dewsnups' counterclaim. Plaintiffs' have not objected to this 
discussion in the Dewsnups' Appellants Brief (See Appellants 
Brief, pp. 20-23). 
12 
D. ANY DISPOSITION OF THE DEWSNUPS' 
COUNTERCLAIM WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHOUT 
NOTICE, AND THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF DUE 
PROCESS AND IN VIOLATION OF RULE 56(c) OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
In their Appellees Brief, plaintiffs' missed the point of 
the Dewsnups1 discussion of the above-captioned issues. Clearly 
the Dewsnups received notice of plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment on plaintiffs' claim, however neither plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment nor the affidavit filed in support thereof 
either mentioned the Dewsnups' counterclaim nor any of the issues 
raised in the Dewsnups' counterclaim. Therefore, although the 
Dewsnups had notice of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on 
plaintiffs' claim, the Dewsnups had no notice of any motion for 
summary judgment on their counterclaim or that their counterclaim 
was in any way subject to adjudication. (See Appellants Brief, 
pp. 23-28) 
II 
THE DEWSNUPS' MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COUNTERCLAIM 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
A. THE CORRECTNESS STANDARD SHOULD BE USED 
IN REVIEWING JUDGE HARDING'S DENIAL OF 
THE DEWSNUPS' MOTION TO AMEND THEIR 
COUNTERCLAIM. 
Judge Harding based his denial of the Dewsnups' motion to 
amend their counterclaim on the conclusion of law that the 
Dewsnups' counterclaim had been "implicitly" disposed of by the 
summary judgment. (See the Memorandum Decision, attached as 
Exhibit G to the Dewsnups' Appellants Brief and at R. 348-49) As 
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discussed in Appellants Brief, where the lower court1s decision 
is based on a legal conclusion, the appellate court will not give 
deference to the lower courtfs decision but will use the 
correctness standard, even though the deference standard would 
otherwise be applicable. (See Appellants Brief, pp. 2-4) 
B. THE AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
There is only one allegation made in the Dewsnups' amended 
counterclaim that the Dewsnups tried to raise in the bankruptcy 
proceeding—that the Trust Deed was paid in full and therefore 
should have been released (which is alleged as part of Claim Two 
of the amended counterclaim, See R. 204). Although the Dewsnups 
tried to raise that issue in the bankruptcy proceeding, because 
the bankruptcy court concluded that the entry of the Summary 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure did not violate the Section 
362 automatic stay, the court gave full faith and credit to the 
Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and did not and could 
not rule on that issue. 
Plaintiffs belabor the point that this issue was raised in 
the Dewsnups1 complaint filed in bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs 
also belabor the point that the Dewsnups1 complaint filed in 
bankruptcy court was dismissed with prejudice. However, 
plaintiffs miss the point that even where an issue is raised in a 
pleading and even where a judgment is rendered on that pleading 
"with prejudice," the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel do not bar relitigation of that issue unless that issue 
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was "actually litigated" in a previous suit, was "essential to 
the resolution of [the previous] suit" and was "competently, 
fully and fairly litigated" in the previous suit. Copper State 
Thrift and Loan v. Bruno. 735 P.2d 387, 389-91 (Utah App. 1987). 
None of those requirements are met in this case. 
As a general rule, a state court judgment is res judicata on 
a bankruptcy court, and a bankruptcy court will not go behind the 
state court judgment to determine whether it was properly 
decided. Heiser v. Woodruff. 327 U.S. 726 (1946). Thus, unless 
an exception could be found, the bankruptcy court would accept 
the Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure as conclusive, and 
would not consider whether the Summary Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure had been properly granted (i.e., would not consider 
the Dewsnups1 allegations that the Trust Deed had been 
satisfied). In Paragraphs 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the Dewsnups1 
complaint filed in bankruptcy court, the Dewsnups alleged that 
such an exception existed. (R. 230-231). In those paragraphs the 
Dewsnups alleged that the Summary Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure had been entered in violation of the Section 362 
automatic stay and was therefore void. The Summary Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure had been signed April 22, 1980, but not 
entered until April 24, 1980. The Dewsnups filed for bankruptcy 
on April 22, 1980. Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code 
automatically stays the "continuation...of [a] judicial...action 
or proceeding against the debtor" then in progress upon the 
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filing of bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a)(1) (Supp. 1991). 
Any action taken in violation of the stay is void. 2 Collier on 
Bankruptcy, Section 362.11 (15th Ed.). Therefore the Dewsnups 
argued that even though the Summary Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure had been signed before the Dewsnups had filed 
bankruptcy, because it had not been entered until after they had 
filed for bankruptcy the Summary Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure was entered in violation of Section 362 automatic 
stay and was therefore void. 
The bankruptcy court, however, rejected that argument and 
held that the Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure was not 
entered in violation of the Section 362 automatic stay, and 
therefore was not void. Therefore, the bankruptcy court accepted 
the Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure as a valid state 
court judgment and refused to consider its underlying merits 
(i.e., refused to consider paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the 
Dewsnups1 complaint filed in bankruptcy court that alleged that 
the Trust Deed had been satisfied). 
Once the bankruptcy court ruled that the Summary Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure was not entered in violation of the 
Section 362 automatic stay, the bankruptcy court did not and 
could not consider the factual issues underlying the Summary 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, but had to grant it full 
faith and credit as a state court judgment. Had the bankruptcy 
court failed to grant full faith and credit to the Summary 
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Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, the bankruptcy court would 
have been reversed. This is exactly what happened in Heiser v. 
Woodruff. 327 U.S. 726 (1946). In that case, the bankruptcy 
court set aside a state court judgment and the United States 
Supreme Court reversed, stating that a valid state court judgment 
is res judicata on a bankruptcy court, and the bankruptcy court 
cannot further litigate the issues underlying a valid state court 
judgment: 
[W]e are aware of no principle of law or equity which 
sanctions the rejection by a [bankruptcy] court of the 
salutary principle of res judicata...[where a state 
court judgment has been validly rendered] that 
[judgment] is now res judicata and may not further be 
litigated in the bankruptcy proceeding...[T]he 
principles of res judicata preclude the revival of the 
litigation in the bankruptcy court. 
Id. at 733-34, 736. 
Because the bankruptcy court never reached the issue of whether 
the Trust Deed had been satisfied, the Dewsnups are not precluded 
from raising that issue in Claim Two of their amended 
counterela im. 
The courts have distinguished between two branches of the 
doctrine of res judicata — "claim preclusion" (or traditional 
res judicata) and "issue preclusion" (or collateral estoppel). 
"Claim preclusion" involves the relitigation of a claim or cause 
of action that was litigated in a previous case. "Issue 
preclusion" involves relitigation of an issue that was litigated 
in a previous case. See generally Copper State Thrift and Loan 
v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah App. 1987). 
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This case involves the "issue preclusion" branch of res 
judicata (or collateral estoppel). Claim Two of the Dewsnups' 
amended counterclaim alleges a cause of action based on Section 
57-1-33, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. (R. 204). The 
Dewsnups1 allegation in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of their 
complaint filed in bankruptcy court did not allege that same 
cause of action, but did allege one of its elements, i.e., that 
the indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed was paid in full. 
The elements of "issue preclusion" (or collateral estoppel) 
are set forth in Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 
387 (Utah App. 1987). Collateral estoppel only bars the 
relitigation of an issue that has been "actually litigated" in a 
previous suit, was "essential to the resolution of [the previous] 
suit," and was "competently, fully and fairly litigated" in the 
previous suit. Id. at 389-91. (See also Restatement Second, 
Judgments, Section 27 (1982)). None of those conditions were met 
in this case. Because the bankruptcy case was disposed of on 
other grounds, the allegations in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of 
the Dewsnups1 complaint filed in bankruptcy court were never 
"actually litigated." Furthermore, because that case was 
disposed of on other grounds, those allegations were not 
"essential to the resolution of [that] suit." Finally, since the 
bankruptcy court never reached the issue of whether the Trust 
Deed had been satisfied, that issue was never "competently, 
fairly and fully litigated." 
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The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that, where an 
issue has been raised but not decided in a prior action, res 
judicata does not bar litigation of that issue in a later action. 
For example, in Todaro v. Gardner, 285 P.2d 839 (Utah 1955), a 
party filed an action in Arizona .based on two causes of action. 
The Arizona court ruled on one cause of action, but did not reach 
the other cause of actione When a separate action was filed in 
Utah based on the cause action that had not been ruled on, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that res judicata did not bar litigation 
of that cause of action since it had not been reached by the 
Arizona court. Id. at 841. Similarly, in Glen Allen Mining Co. 
v. Park Galena Mining Co.. 296 P. 231 (Utah 1931), a party filed 
an action to set aside a foreclosure sale and to hold the 
property in trust. The court upheld the foreclosure sale but did 
not rule on the trust issue. When a separate case of action was 
filed on the trust issue, the Utah Supreme Court held that res 
judicata did not bar litigation of that issue, since the court 
had never reached that issue, id. at 233. 
The party asserting the doctrine of collateral estoppel has 
the burden of proving its elements. Citizens Casualty Company of 
New York v. Hackett. 410 P.2d 767 (Utah 1966). Plaintiffs have 
not and cannot meet their burden of proof in this case. The 
issue of whether the debt secured by the Trust Deed had been paid 
was not "actually litigated" in bankruptcy court, was not 
"essential to the resolution of [that case]" and has not been 
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 competently, fairly and fully litigated." The Dewsnups are 
therefore not barred from raising that issue as part of Claim Two 
of their amended counterclaim. 
C. THE FILING OF THE AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
WOULD NOT BE UNDULY PREJUDICIAL TO 
PLAINTIFFS. 
The Dewsnups have not been able to prosecute their counter-
claim until now because their counterclaim was transferred by 
operation of law to the bankruptcy trustee upon the filing of 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy by the Dewsnups, and was not abandoned until 
January, 1991. Although over 10 years have past since the 
counterclaim was filed, delay alone is not sufficient grounds to 
deny a Rule 15 motion to amend. In Howey v. United States, 481 
F'.2d 1187, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 1973), the court stated: 
[W]e know of no case where delay alone was deemed 
sufficient grounds to deny a Rule 15(a) motion to 
amend...The purpose of the litigation process is to 
vindicate meritorious claims. Refusing, solely because 
of delay, to permit an amendment to a pleading in order 
to state a potentially valid claim would hinder this 
purpose while not promoting any other sound judicial 
policy. 
In Howey, the appellate court overruled the trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion to amend its third party complaint after 5 
years, stating that "[tjhe record fails to show any basis for 
finding that the proffered amendment would have unduly prejudiced 
[the opposing party.]" Id. at 1191. See also Issen v. GSC 
Enterprises, Inc.. 522 F.Supp. 390 (N.D. 111. 1981) (allowing 
plaintiff to amend his complaint 7 years after the action was 
filed, stating that "though it is chronologically late in the 
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litigation," the defendants "have failed to establish that they 
would be unduly burdened prejudice by this amendment." Id. at 
394.); Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 101 F. Supp. 549 
(W.D. Penn. 1951) (granting a motion to amend a complaint after 8 
years, stating that "[n]o time is prescribed by Rule 15(a) for 
amendment by leave of the court." Id. at 552.). 
This case has been ongoing for over 10 years now and 
plaintiffs have had notice of the Dewsnups1 counterclaim since 
the beginning. Without citing a single case to support their 
position, plaintiffs allege that the Dewsnups1 motion to amend 
their counterclaim should be denied because it would be 
"prejudicial" to plaintiffs. The only reasons for this given by 
the plaintiffs are that LeMar Dewsnup had died, Judge Burns has 
retired and the passage of time has made discovery "virtually 
impossible." (Appellees Brief, pp. 19-20) However, the 
allegations in the amended counterclaim are largely based on 
existing documents that are a matter of record in this case 
(e.g. the Trust Deed, the Promissory Notes, etc.) (R. 201-05). 
Except for LaMar Dewsnup, all of the individuals mentioned in the 
amended counterclaim (Aletha Dewsnup, Joseph Henroid and Earl 
Peck) are alive and available for discovery and trial. 
Furthermore, any disadvantage because of the death of LaMar 
Dewsnup will be to Aletha Dewsnup, and not to plaintiffs. 
Finally, a new judge has been assigned to this case who should be 
very capable of replacing Judge Burns, whose only involvement in 
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this case was to enter the Summary Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure. Consequently, there is no good reason not to allow 
the Dewsnups to amend their counterclaim. 
As discussed in Appellants Brief (at pp. 37-41), in 
reviewing a denial of a motion to amend, this Court has always 
been liberal in granting leave to amend and has held that where 
the other party will have an adequate opportunity to respond to 
the amended pleadings, leave to amend should be granted. The 
policy of this Court has always been that parties should be 
allowed to adjudicate their legitimate claims: 
[The Rules of Civil Procedure] must all be looked to in 
the light of their even more fundamental purpose of 
liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end 
that the parties are afforded the privilege of 
presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have 
pertaining to their dispute. 
Cheney v. Rucker. 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963). 
As in Howev, the record in this case "fails to show any basis for 
finding that the proffered amendment would ... unduly prejudice" 
plaintiffs. See 481 F.2d at 1191. The Dewsnups' motion to 
amend their counterclaim should have been granted. 
D* THE DEWSNUPS1 BANKRUPTCIES DID PRECLUDE 
THEM FROM A TIMELY MOTION TO AMEND THEIR 
COUNTERCLAIM. 
Plaintiffs correctly state that the Dewsnups did make two 
aborted attempts to reorganize under Chapter 11 before filing for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7. In the best of all worlds, the 
Dewsnups probably should have filed their motion to amend their 
counterclaim before filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy. But the fact 
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that that did not happen does not effect the validity of the 
Dewsnups1 counterclaim and should not deprive them of the 
opportunity to have their counterclaim adjudicated. The 
Dewsnups1 counterclaim is valid and the Dewsnups, having regained 
control of their counterclaim from the bankruptcy trustee, have 
promptly filed a motion to amend their counterclaim and should be 
allowed to pursue their counterclaim to its conclusion. 
Ill 
JUDGE HARDING ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECONSIDER AND SET 
ASIDE OR CERTIFY AS FINAL THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
All of the cases cited by plaintiffs for the proposition 
that the Utah courts "have never recognized a motion to 
reconsider" involve the reconsideration of a final judgment. See 
Peav v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980) (final order); Utah State 
Employees Credit Union v. Riding, 469 P.2d 1 (Utah 1970) (final 
judgment), Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Utah 1966) (final 
order); Haner v. Haner, 373 P.2d 577 (Utah 1962) (final divorce 
decree). (See Appellees Brief, pp. 22-23) 
This case does not involve a final judgement. Because the 
Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure did not dispose of all 
the claims on this case (having failed to dispose of the 
Dewsnups' counterclaim) it is not a final judgment, and therefore 
under Rule 54(b) it can still be revised; 
[A]n order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims 
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
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decision is subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Emphasis added). 
In Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42 
(Utah App. 1988), the court expressly distinguished between 
reconsidering "final judgments" and reconsidering, under Rule 
54(b), judgments which do not dispose of all the claims in a 
case, such as the Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure: 
A motion to reconsider is not expressly available under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [citation omitted.] 
See Peav v. Peav. 607 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1980). 
However, by implication Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure does allow for the possibility of a 
judge changing his or her mind in cases involving 
multiple parties or multiple claims. 
Rule 54(b) allows courts to readjust prior rulings in 
complex cases as subsequent developments in the cases 
might suggest, unless those rulings disposed of the 
entire claims or parties and those rulings were 
specifically certified as final. 
Id. at 44, ftnt 5. 
Because the Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure did not 
dispose of all the claims in this case and was not certified as 
final, it is subject to revision under Rule 54(b). 
CONCLUSION 
Over 10 years ago a judgment was erroneously entered against 
the Dewsnups. Everyone in this case knows that that judgment was 
incorrect. Plaintiffs have never tried to justify the judgment. 
Neither in the lower court nor in their Appellees Brief have 
plaintiffs ever argued that the judgment was correct. Instead, 
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they argue procedural issues to try to prevent a court from 
correcting that mistake* 
The Dewsnups have suffered enormously as a result of a 
summary judgment that was erroneously granted 10 years ago, and 
they continue to suffer. Because that summary judgment did not 
dispose of the Dewsnups1 counterclaim it did not dispose of all 
the claims in this case and can be set aside under Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Dewsnups should also be 
allowed to amend their counterclaim toward a final adjudication 
thereof. 
Aletha Dewsnup is a 65-year-old farmerfs widow that lives 
near Delta, Utah who has persevered for over 10 years in her 
knowledge that the mortgage on the farm was paid and plaintiffs 
had no right to foreclose on the farm. Aletha Dewsnup looks to 
this court for relief from the burden of injustice. 
Substantively and procedurally Aletha Dewsnup's case is right. 
This court should grant her the relief she seeks. 
Dated this ^ t£^ day of October, 1991. 
Russell A. Cline 
Attorney for T. LaMar 
and Aletha Dewsnup 
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Russell A. Cline (4298) 
123 2nd Avenue, T-2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 537-1931 
Attorney for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND, 
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees 
of United Precision Machine 
and Engineering Company Profit 
Sharing Trust; ABCO Insurance 
Agency, Inc., a Utah Corpor-
ation; and, JOSEPH L. HENROID, 
Trustee for the ANNETTE. JACOB 
TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA 
DEWSNUP, ARROW INVESTMENT CO. 
a Limited Partnership, THE 
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF BERKLEY, 
IMPERIAL LAND TITLE INC., as 
Trustee and EUGENE L. CARSON 
and ELAINE CARSON as Bene-
ficiaries, STRINGHAM, MAZURAN, 
LARSEN & SABIN, a Professional 
Corporation, MINERAL FERTILIZER 
CO., INC, and HARRY V. KAPS, 
Defendants. 
SCOTT PIERCE AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 7191 
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T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and 
ALETHA DEWSNUP, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND, 
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees 
of United Precision Machine 
and Engineering Company Profit 
Sharing Trust; ABCO Insurance 
Agency, Inc., a Utah Corpor-
ation; and JOSEPH L. HENROID, 
Trustee for the ANNETTE JACOB 
TRUST, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Scott Pierce having been duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly authorized and licensed to practice 
law in the State of Utah. 
2. I was one of the attorneys representing the Dewsnups in 
Adversary Proceeding No. 87PC-0116 in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the State of Utah. 
3. The Amended Complaint to Determine Validity of Lien (the 
"Complaint") attached as Exhibit A to the plaintiffs' memorandum in 
this case, dated January 31, 1991, was signed by me. 
-2-
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4e I was one of the attorneys representing the Dewsnups in 
the trial on the Complaint, held before the Honorable Glen E. Clark 
of the United States Bankruptcy Court, on June 25 and 26, 1987. 
5. I was present at the trial during the entire proceeding. 
6. Paragraphs 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the Complaint alleged 
that the plaintiffs' Summary Judgment and Foreclosure Decree had 
been entered in violations of the Section 362 automatic stay since 
it had been signed, but not entered, until after the Dewsnups had 
filed bankruptcy. 
7. Judge Clark ruled from the bench that * the Summary 
Judgment and Foreclosure Decree was not entered in violation of the 
Section 362 automatic stay. 
8. Having ruled that the Summary Judgment and Foreclosure 
Decree was not entered in violation of the Section 362 automatic 
stay, Judge Clark gave full faith and credit to the Summary 
Judgment and Foreclosure Decree, and refused to consider the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Com-
plaint, which went to the underlying claims in the Summary Judgment 
and Foreclosure Decree. 
9. No evidence was introduced at trial on paragraphs 8, 9, 
10 and 11. of the Complaint. 
10. Judge Clark did not consider the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Complaint. 
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11• The allegations set forth in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 
of the Complaint were not litigated or considered by the bankruptcy 
court in any form or fashion• 
12. I have reviewed the Amended Counterclaim attached as 
Exhibit A to the Dewsnups1 Motion to Amend Counterclaim, dated 
January 22, 1991. 
13. None of the allegations or claims set forth in the 
Amended Counterclaim were litigated or considered by the bankruptcy 
court in any form or fashion. 
Subscribed and sworn to me this // day of February, 1991. 
<^^/^^^ (ZA^^^ 
My commission expires: Residing a t : 
c7^a^6 ^AaJcrA 
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